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This paper shows that in a search model where future employers of trained workers do 
not benefit from the training in other firms, investment into general training will only be 
below the competitive level if workers are credit constrained. If workers are credit con-
strained, then the training firm cannot recover the cost of training since trained workers 
will search for a better paid job. This does, however, not imply that trainees will benefit 
from training. Only if the trainee wage is bounded by the workers' credit constraints do 
trainees gain from training. 
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* I wish to thank Daron Acemoglu, Melvyn Coles and Klaus Schmidt for their useful comments.  1 Introduction
Becker (1993) shows that in a competitive labor market workers should pay for general
training since they receive the full return to training. In a search model with bargaining,
I show that search frictions per se do not necessarily cause underinvestment into general
training and thus conﬁrm Becker’s result that investment into general training can be
eﬃcient if workers are not credit constrained. The underlying reason is that future
employers need not proﬁt from the training in other ﬁrms, if their proﬁts are driven
down to zero as positive proﬁts trigger vacancy creation. Since future employers of
trained workers do not beneﬁt from the training in other ﬁrms, the training ﬁrm and
the worker can, if workers are not credit constrained, enter into a long-term contract
that guarantees that the training level will be eﬃcient.
This is the diﬀerence to models by Acemoglu (1997) or Acemoglu and Pischke
(1999), who also explain ﬁrm ﬁnanced general training with search frictions. In their
models part of the return goes to future employers as a result of the compressed wage
structure and a given separation rate of workers from their training ﬁrms. The fact
that future employers beneﬁti m p l i e st h a ti n v e s t m e n ti nt r a i n i n gw i l lb ei n e ﬃcient,
since future employers cannot be part of a training contract.
If workers are credit constrained, then the training ﬁrm will still provide some train-
ing, because when deciding whether to train an unskilled worker or not, the ﬁrm faces
the trade oﬀ between training an unskilled worker at its own expense or recruiting a
skilled worker from the market. The diﬀerence in recruitment costs between unskilled
workers and skilled workers can be used to pay for the general training, a point al-
ready mentioned by Oatey (1970) and Stevens (1994, 2001). While Stevens (1994,
2001) assumed diﬀerent recruitment cost, the model presented here endogenizes the
recruitment cost.1
Even if workers are credit constrained, they need not beneﬁt from training, because
1Oatey (1970) presents no formal model.
1when posting the trainee contract the training ﬁrm can lower the trainee wage to take
away the trained worker’s expected gain from searching for another job provided the
implied trainee wage does not become negative. Trainees gain from training only if the
trainee wage is bounded by the workers’ credit constraints.
The model presented in this chapter follows the line of other research showing
that labor market frictions provide an incentive for ﬁrms to invest in general training.
Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) show that a compressed wage structure is suﬃcient for
ﬁrms to pay at least partly for general training and that credit constraints, which are
mentioned by Becker (1993) as a reason why ﬁrms may pay for general training, are
not necessary. This compressed wage structure may be the result of an information
asymmetry between training ﬁrms and not-training ﬁrms about the ability of individual
workers as Katz and Ziderman (1990), Chang and Wang (1996) and Acemoglu and
Pischke (1998) show. Acemoglu (1997) or Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) model ﬁrm
ﬁnanced general training with search frictions. They ﬁnd that ﬁrms can only extract
part of the return since future employer beneﬁt from the training in other ﬁrms. Hence
they are not willing to ﬁnance general training up to the eﬃcient level. A third strand
of the literature explains general training in combination of ﬁrm-speciﬁc training.
The plan of the chapter is as follows. Section 2 presents the framework. Section 3
derives the workers’ behavior followed by the analysis of labor turnover in the steady
state in Section 4. Section 5 derives the ﬁrms’ vacancy creation decision, the general
training condition in a situation where workers are credit constrained and where they
are not. Section 6 establishes that multiple labor market equilibria exist if workers are
credit constrained. Section 7 presents extensions concerning the wage formation. The
chapter concludes by summarizing the main results.
22T h e F r a m e w o r k
Firms
The model considers an inﬁnite-horizon, stationary labor market in continuous time.
The measure of ﬁr m si sn o r m a l i z e dt ou n i t y .F i r m sa r ea s s u m e dt ob er i s kn e u t r a la n d
to discount future payments by the rate of interest r.A l lﬁr m sl i v ei n ﬁnitely. Firms
search for workers by creating vacancies vi f o rt h er e s p e c t i v el a b o rm a r k e t s ,w h e r e
i ∈ {s,u}. s stands for the labor market of skilled workers and u f o rt h el a b o rm a r k e t
of unskilled workers. The fact that workers of diﬀerent skill are assumed to search in
diﬀerent markets implies that ﬁrms opening a vacancy for one type of worker have no
use for another type of worker and can therefore commit not to employ a worker of
another type. The advertising cost for a vacancy per time unit is given by adt.
The bargaining wages wi for skilled and unskilled workers are taken as given by
the ﬁrm when it chooses the training γ and the promotion rate ρ.T h e ﬁrm oﬀers
with probability γdt an employed, unskilled workers a training contract specifying a
trainee-wage wt and the commitment by the ﬁrm to pay the education cost c.T h e
general training contract is a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer by the ﬁrm. The large number
of unskilled workers per ﬁrm implies that the ﬁrm has eﬀectively all market power
and can therefore oﬀer a contract that makes an unskilled worker exactly indiﬀerent
between accepting and rejecting the oﬀer.
Firms produce according to a constant return to scale production function. The
output produced over the period dt is given by an strictly increasing, concave and twice
continuously diﬀerentiable function
ydt = F (lu,l s + lt)dt.
Since training is instantaneous, trainees are able to work as skilled labor. Therefore,
the skilled labor force (ls + lt) is given by the sum of skilled workers and trainees. The
unskilled labor force is given by lu.
3Firms promote trainees to a full skilled job with a respective market wage at rate
ρdt. Furthermore, I assume that the ﬁrm is able to commit to its promotion promise.
Workers
New market entrants start their working career as unskilled workers, whose measure
is deﬁned by m. If they are trained by the ﬁrm, they become skilled worker. Workers
are assumed to be risk neutral and to discount future payments at rate r.I fw o r k e r s
are credit constrained, they cannot make any payment to the ﬁrm. A worker’s stay in
the labor market is exponentially distributed with parameter δ>0. If a worker exits
the labor market, he is replaced by a new individual.
All unskilled workers start searching as unemployed in the labor market for un-
skilled. During that period they receive unemployment income normalized to zero.
Individuals only search if the expected gain is strictly positive. Thus, only trained
workers that are not promoted start to search for a skilled job. The labor markets for
skilled and unskilled are separated. For simplicity, I assume that employed workers
cannot become unemployed. Employment ends with a positive probability per period
(here δdt) because of workers exiting the labor market.
Matching
Deﬁne si as the measure of workers searching in a particular labor market. The labor
market tightness is deﬁned as the ratio of vacancies to searching workers, θi ≡ vi/si.
Deﬁne M(vi,s i) as a Pissarides-type matching function, where M(0,s i)=M(vi,0) = 0.
It is assumed to be increasing, twice continuously diﬀerentiable, concave and linearly
homogeneous. It hence has constant returns to matching and can be written in terms
of the labor market tightness M(vi,s i) ≡ siq(θi). The properties of M(vi,s i) imply
that q(θi) is an increasing function of θi and satisﬁes the Inada conditions:
i) q(0) = 0, ii) lim
θi→+0
q(θi)




A searching worker meets a vacancy at the Poisson rate M(vi,s i)/si = q(θi).Av a c a n c y
4is in turn contacted by a worker at the Poisson rate M(vi,s i)/vi = q(θi)/θi.F o r
notational reasons I deﬁne:
λi ≡ q(θi), and ηi ≡ q(θi)/θi.
Bargaining
Wages are negotiated by unions and an employers’ association. The unions’ bargaining
power is given by β. Thus, for each skill level i ∈ {s,u} t h ea g r e e dw a g ei sg i v e nb y
wi = βF
0
li (lu,l s + lt),( 1 )
where F0
li (lu,l s + lt) denotes the marginal product of a worker with skill level i.F i r m s
and workers take these wages as given when they make their decisions. In Section 7, I
allow for individual bargaining.
3 Individuals’ Behavior
As new market entrants are unemployed, they start to search for a job. Once employed
the individual can be oﬀered training. This enables him to search for a skilled job
afterwards if he is not promoted by his current employer. The ﬂow value of being
unemployed as unskilled worker is given by (r + δ)U.A t t h e r a t e λu he meets an
unskilled job vacancy and gets the wage wu.
(r + δ)U = λu max[Vu(wu) − U,0].( 2 )
The value of being employed as an unskilled worker at wage wu is given by Vu(wu),
(r + δ)Vu(wu)=wu + γ max[Vt(wt) − Vu(wu),0],( 3 )
where the current employer oﬀers the worker a training contract at rate γ.At r a i n e e
is promoted with probability ρ by the current employer. At the same time he can
5search for a skilled job vacancy at another ﬁrm (and matches with probability λs).
The implicit assumption that the ﬁrm matches the outside wage when promoting its
trainee is without loss of generality. Promoting and paying a wage less than ws cannot
be optimal since the trainees would still search and leave at the same rate λs as before.
Paying a higher wage would reduce the ﬁrms proﬁt. The value of being employed as
trainee at wage wt is thus given by
(r + δ)Vt(wt)=wt +( λs + ρ)max[Vts(ws) − Vt(wt),0].( 4 )
T h ev a l u ef o raf o r m e rt r a i n e et ob ee m p l o y e da ss k i l l e dw o r k e ra tw a g ews is given by:
(r + δ)Vts(ws)=ws.( 5 )
The four Bellman equations (2), (3), (4), and (5) can be used to derive the conditions
under which it is proﬁtable for a worker to change status and hence to start actively
searching for a vacancy in the corresponding labor market.
For a trainee to search for a skilled job vacancy, it has to be true that the wage for
a skilled worker has to exceed the wage earned as trainee:
Vts(ws) >V t(wt) ⇔ ws >w t.( 6 )
For an employed unskilled worker to accept the training contract, the value of being
employed as trainee Vt(wt) must be at least as great as the value of being employed as
unskilled worker Vu(wu)2
Vt(wt) ≥ Vu(wu) ⇔
(r + δ)wt +( λs + ρ)ws
r + δ + λs + ρ
≥ wu.( 7 )
In other words, the expected wage income from starting as a trainee and later being
employed (with probability λs +ρ) as a skilled worker has to exceed or be equal to the
current wage earned as an unskilled worker.
2This condition does not require a strict inequality, since workers are oﬀered training
contracts without the necessity to participate in search.
6Since it will be optimal for the ﬁrm to oﬀer a wage wt such that the worker is indif-
ferent between accepting and rejecting condition (7) will hold with equality if workers
are not credit constrained. If workers are credit constrained, then the training wage is
bounded below by zero, i.e. wt ≥ 0. Furthermore, the ﬁrm can choose its promotion
strategy ρ,w h i c ha l l o w st h eﬁrm to determine the expected wage of becoming a trainee.
By increasing the promotion rate the ﬁrm is thus able to lower the wage wt acceptable
to a trainee. Returning to the individual’s behavior, it follows from condition (7) that
condition (6) is satisﬁed as long as ws >w u.
4 Steady State Turnover
Unemployment Measures
For every individual who leaves the labor market, a new individual enters unemploy-
ment as an unskilled worker. Thus, the measure δm of individuals enter the unem-
ployment pool as unskilled workers. The measure λuuu of unemployed exit into em-
ployment. In addition, there are some individuals, i.e. δuu, that exit the labor market






Since only one wage prevails in each labor market, workers cannot improve their sit-
uation by searching for an identical job. Consequently, only unemployed and trainees
search.
The inﬂow into employment out of unemployment is given by λuuu.W o r k e r s o f
every type exit employment at the rate δli. From the unskilled labor force γlu become










The outﬂow from unskilled labor γlu equals the inﬂow into the measure of trainees.
The outﬂow from the trainee status is made up by the sum of individuals who exit the
labor market altogether (i.e. δlt), and by the individuals who ﬁnd a skilled job vacancy
at another ﬁrm or are promoted by their current ﬁrm (i.e. (λs + ρ)lt). The measure
of trainees is hence given by
lt =
γ
δ + λs + ρ
lu =
δ





m.( 1 0 )
Skilled workers are recruited internally and externally. From the pool of employed
trainees λslt are recruited externally and ρlt internally. Given the outﬂow of δls from











m.( 1 1 )
Note, that the sum of trainees and skilled workers is independent of ρ, since promotion
alters the status of the workers but not their role in production





m.( 1 2 )
For later analysis, let us brieﬂy focus on the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor, which







.( 1 3 )
The ratio increases with γ, the rate at which unskilled workers are recruited as trainees,
but is independent of the promotion strategy ρ and the labor market frictions of either
market. If a ﬁrm does not train while all other ﬁrms do but recruits skilled workers





δ + λs + ρ
γ
δ
,( 1 4 )
8which depends on the other ﬁrms training γ and promotion rate ρ.
Measure of Searching Individuals
The measure of individuals searching for unskilled job vacancies are the unskilled un-
employed, i.e. su = uu. Employed unskilled workers have no incentive to search for an
identical job at another ﬁrm, since they would just earn the same wage.
The measure of workers searching for skilled job vacancies are the trainees, i.e.
ss = lt =
δ





m.( 1 5 )
Firms inﬂuence ss through γ and ρ without taking it into account. By granting more
unskilled workers general training, ﬁrms increase the pool of people searching for skilled
job vacancies. This makes it easier for other ﬁrms to recruit skilled labor. The resulting
externality does not automatically lead to ineﬃcient investment into training, as shown
in the next section.
5 Firms’ Behavior
Firms maximize their present value. The instruments at hand are to create vacancies vi
for unskilled and skilled workers, to oﬀer unskilled workers general training contracts
at rate γ, to determine the trainee-wage wt and to decide how many trainees ρ are
promoted and given a full skilled worker’s contract. The ﬁr mt a k e st h ew a g e sf o r






⎝F (lu,l s + lt) −
X
i∈{s,u}




9s.t. ˙ lu = ηuvu − (γ + δ)lu
˙ lt = γlu − (δ + λs + ρ)lt
˙ ls = ηsvs + ρlt − δls
wt =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
max
∙






if workers are credit constrained and





The total training costs for a ﬁrm is γluc, which equals the inﬂow of new trainees
multiplied by the cost of education. The ﬁrm contacts a worker with probability ηi per
vacancy, so that the inﬂow out of unemployment into the skilled and unskilled labor
f o r c ei sg i v e nb yηivi.
Note that the marginal product of a trainee is the same as the marginal product
of a skilled worker, since I assume that training is instantaneous. Denote xi as the
co-state variable associated with (16). Then the resulting Euler-conditions are:
∂H
∂vu
: a = ηuxu
∂H
∂ρ





: a = ηsxs
∂H
∂γ
: c = xt − xu
dxu
dt
= xur − F
0
lu (lu,l s + lt)+wu + cγ + xu (δ + γ) − xtγ
dxt
dt
= xtr − F
0
ls (lu,l s + lt)+wt + xt (δ + λs + ρ) − xsρ
dxs
dt
= xsr − F
0
ls (lu,l s + lt)+ws + xsδ.
Recruitment Cost






li (lu,l s + lt) − wi
r + δ
for i ∈ {s,u}.( 1 7 )
10The vacancy creation condition requires that the cost of creating a vacancy a equals
the expected return of a match. In the simple Pissarides (2000) model the vacancy
creation condition determines together with the zero proﬁt condition the number of
ﬁrms (vacancies) in equilibrium. Here, the measure of ﬁrms is ﬁxed to unity, so that
the vacancy creation condition determines the size of a ﬁrm. This also guarantees that
the value of creating a vacancy is equal to zero.
Proposition 1: Given all other ﬁrms train, the recruitment cost for skilled labor is
higher than for unskilled labor.
Proof: Deﬁne Φ(θi) ≡ aθi/q(θi). Given the properties of the matching function, it
follows that
Φ
0(θi) > 0, Φ









li(lu,l t + ls),w h e r eγ is the training rate of all other ﬁrms. From
(14) and the properties of the production function, it follows that the marginal product
of an unskilled worker is increasing in θs and the marginal product of a skilled worker
is decreasing in θs if the ﬁrm does not train. If it trains the marginal product for each
skill level is independent of search frictions, see equation (13). Hence, a strictly positive
and unique θ
∗






Since all other ﬁrms train, the training rate γ is such that e F0
ls(θs,γ) > e F0
lu(θs,γ).G i v e n
equation (1) it follows that F0
ls (lu,l s + lt)−ws >F 0
lu (lu,l s + lt)−wu whether the ﬁrm
trains or not. Thus, according to equation (17) the recruitment cost of a skilled worker








11Rearranging equation (17) shows that the recruitment cost per match equals the





li (lu,l s + lt) − wi
r + δ
In equilibrium the cash ﬂow (i.e. F0
li (lu,l s + lt) − wi) of a skilled worker is greater
than the cash ﬂow of an unskilled worker. The ﬁrm will therefore pay more for the
recruitment of a skilled worker than for an unskilled worker. While for a ﬁrm it is
harder to ﬁnd skilled workers than unskilled workers (i.e. η∗
s <η ∗
u), the matching
technology implies that it is easier for searching skilled individuals to ﬁnd a vacancy





Firms make zero proﬁt, since they pay one part of the marginal product for re-
cruitment and the other part in wages to workers themselves. Thus, ﬁrms that recruit
trained workers pay them their eﬀective marginal product and hence do not proﬁtf r o m
recruiting trained workers. The fact that the future employer of a trained worker does
not beneﬁt from the training in other ﬁrms implies that search frictions per se need
not cause underinvestment in training.
Promotion Decision
The ﬁrm can use promotion to prevent trainees from searching for a skilled job vacancy
at another employer. The promotion condition requires that the shadow value of
a trainee equals the shadow value of a skilled worker plus the discounted value of
the promotion, which equals the discounted wage diﬀerence between a skilled and an
unskilled worker
xt = xs +
ws − wu
r + δ
.( 1 8 )
The value of a trainee xt after substituting the trainee wage wt out is given by
xt =
F0




r + δ + λs + ρ
,( 1 9 )




ls (lu,l s + lt) − max
∙






r + δ + λs + ρ
.( 2 0 )
Thus, the promotion condition (18) can only be satisﬁed if unskilled workers are not
credit constrained and if the promotion rate is inﬁnity (see equation 19). This implies
that in turn for the promotion the ﬁrm demands a lump-sum transfer of the worker
that is equivalent to the value of the promotion (i.e. (ws − wu)/(r + δ)), because the
ﬁrm can extract all rent from an unskilled worker when posting the training contract.
Training Decision
Firms promote all trainees if workers are not credit constrained, and thereby keep them
oﬀ the skilled labor market. This implies that workers do not beneﬁt from training,
since they pay for their promotion up front. At the same time future employers do
not beneﬁt from the training of other ﬁrms either, since all skilled workers stay with
their training ﬁrm. Thus, if workers are not credit constrained the training level will be
equal to the level of training in a competitive market, where workers pay for training.
Proposition 2: If workers are not credit constrained, ﬁr m sw i l lt r a i nu pt ot h ec o m -
petitive level, i.e. (r + δ)c = b F0
ls(γ∗) − b F0
lu(γ∗),w h e r e b F0
li(γ) ≡ F0
li(lu,l t + ls).













Adding up gives the same training condition as in a competitive market, where worker
pay for training.
(r + δ)c = b F
0
ls(γ
∗) − b F
0
lu(γ
∗).( 2 1 )
13Note that the diﬀerence in the marginal products between skilled and unskilled workers
is higher for ﬁrms that do not train than for training ﬁrms, since (lt + ls)/lu >l s/lu
according to equation (13) and (14). The return to training will therefore exceed the
cost of training so that training is optimal. ¤
If workers are credit constrained, then ﬁrms cannot extract all the rent from workers
by promoting them immediately. Firms will therefore not promote at all, i.e. ρ =0
and pay only a positive trainee wage if the probability λs that a trained worker leaves
to another ﬁrm is small enough to ensure that




Otherwise, the ﬁrm will pay nothing to trainees.
The diﬀerence in recruitment costs can still be used to pay for the general training
of some unskilled workers. This can be seen by looking at the Euler equation, which
implies that the diﬀerence in the shadow value of a trainee and the shadow value of
employing an unskilled worker has to equal the cost of training (i.e. c = xt − xu). In
other words, the cost of general training has to equal the discounted cash ﬂows between
trainees and unskilled workers. Using condition (7) to substitute the trainee-wage and
rearranging gives
(r + δ)c =
(r + δ)F0
ls (lu,l s + lt)+m i n[ λsws,(r + δ + λs)wu]
r + δ + λs
− F
0
lu (lu,l s + lt),( 2 2 )
where λsws applies if the training wage is positive and (r + δ + λs)wu if not.
Proposition 3: For 0 <λ s ≤ λs,w h e r eλs =( r + δ)wu/(ws − wu), the training
level γ1 is below the competitive level γ∗ (since trainees leave their training ﬁrm). For
λs > λs the training level γ2 <γ 1 <γ ∗ is even lower, since unskilled workers receive
part of the return to training.
Proof: For 0 <λ s ≤ λs and after substituting the trainee wage and the wage for
14skilled workers out, the training condition is according to equation (22) given by
(r + δ)c =
r + δ + λsβ




1) − b F
0
lu(γ
1).( 2 3 )
Comparing this condition to the competitive level
(r + δ)c = b F
0
ls(γ




and noting that the marginal product of a skilled worker is decreasing in γ and the
marginal product of a unskilled worker is increasing in γ as well as noting that β ∈
(0,1), it follows that γ1 <γ ∗.
For λs > λs the training condition is according to equation (22) given by
(r + δ)c =
r + δ








Substituting λs for λs implies
(r + δ)c<b F
0
ls(γ
2) − (2 − β) b F
0
lu(γ
2).( 2 4 )
Substituting in equation (23) gives
(r + δ)c ≥ b F
0
ls(γ
1) − (2 − β) b F
0
lu(γ
1).( 2 5 )
Comparing equation (24) and (25) gives γ2 <γ 1.
The fact that workers get part of the return to training can be seen by looking at
equations (2) to (5) and comparing (i) wt = wu − λs
ws−wu
r+δ with (ii) wt =0 .I n t h e
case of (i) it follows according to condition (7) that Vt(wt)=Vu(wu) which implies
U|(i) = λu
r+δ+λuwu. In case of (ii) it follows that
U|(ii) =
λu





r + δ + λu
γ2
r + δ + γ2
λs





Although future employers do not beneﬁt from employing trained workers, training
will be ineﬃcient as Proposition 3 shows, because workers are credit constrained. The
15reason is that for the training ﬁrm to recover its training expenses fully, all trained
workers would have to stay with their training ﬁrm for their entire working life and
receive the wage of an unskilled worker. Outside ﬁrms are, however, willing to pay
them the wage of a skilled worker. This induces trained workers to search for another
employer.
The training ﬁrm can prevent workers from starting to search by promoting them
immediately and paying them the market wage of a high skilled worker. If workers are
not credit constrained, then the ﬁrm can make the worker indiﬀerent between being
unskilled or becoming a trainee. The reason is that the ﬁrm temporarily possesses
all the bargaining power when oﬀering the trainee contract. It can therefore demand
the value of the promotion as a lump-sum payment up-front. This guarantees that a
training ﬁrm gets all the return from training and will therefore invest eﬃciently.
If workers are credit constrained, then the training ﬁrm cannot recover the cost of
the promotion via a lump-sum transfer. The training ﬁrm will therefore not promote
and will accept that trained workers search for another job. Thus, training will be
ineﬃcient.
Trained workers need not beneﬁtf r o mt r a i n i n g ,b e c a u s ew h e np o s t i n gt h et r a i n e e
contract the training ﬁrm can lower the trainee wage to take away the trained worker’s
expected gain from searching for another job provided the implied trainee wage does
not become negative. If the trainee wage had to be negative in order to extract the
whole rent from the trainees, credit constraints on the worker’s side imply that they
cannot pay a negative wage. Thus, trained workers will be better oﬀ compared to
unskilled workers since they get part of the return to training. This, however, implies
that ﬁrms will train even less.
166 Labor Market Equilibrium
The aim of this section is to show that in an economy with credit constrained workers
there may be multiple training equilibria. If workers are not credit constrained, pro-
motion in turn for an equivalent lump-sum payment from the trainee to the training
ﬁrm prevents trainees from quitting and leads to a unique labor market equilibrium.
Deﬁnition: Labor Market Equilibrium
In a labor market equilibrium, ﬁrms create vacancies according to (17), oﬀer general
training at rate γ satisfying (22) if workers are credit constrained and (21) if workers
are not credit constrained and are promoted immediately. Workers follow an optimal
search strategy according to (2) - (5) and bargaining wages are formed according to (1).
Proposition 4: If workers are not credit constrained, then a unique labor market
equilibrium exists.
If workers are credit constrained, multiple equilibria with ineﬃcient training can exist,
where a high training equilibrium is sustained by a low matching rate for trainees and




s and γ∗ >γ a >γ b.
Proof: Part 1: Existence and uniqueness if workers are not credit constrained.
Since b F 0
ls(γ)− b F0
lu(γ) goes to inﬁnity for γ → 0 a n dt oz e r of o rγ →∞ ,au n i q u eγ∗ > 0
for the training rate in equation (21) exists. The wages are w∗
u,w ∗





s are functions of γ∗ via the marginal product of a worker but not vice
versa. Thus, the vacancy creation condition (17) implies a unique market tightness
θ
∗
i for each market. Wages are uniquely determined by equation (1) via the marginal
product.
Part 2: Existence and multiplicity, if workers are credit constrained.
Again the property of the production function implies that γj > 0 for j =1 ,2 for
the training rate in equation (22) exists. To establish the possibility of multiplicity it
is suﬃcient to show that there are multiple (θ
∗
s,γj) that satisfy the vacancy creation
17condition (17) for skilled workers and the training equation (22). The training condition
can be written as













r + δ + λsβ
r + δ + λs





r + δ + λs
and h2 =1− β for j =2 .
Note that fj (θ
∗
s) is decreasing in θ
∗
s and the rhs of equation (26) is decreasing in γj.
In the vacancy creation condition (17) the rhs is decreasing in θ
∗
s and in γj.T h u s ,





If workers are credit constrained, ﬁrms are deprived of the promotion instrument,
and general training generates a search externality since ﬁrms do not take into account
that by training they increase the pool ss of people searching for skilled job vacancies
— compare equation (15) — and that by doing so it becomes harder for other trainees
to ﬁnd a job. This lower separation rate increases the ﬁrm’s return to general training,
which sustains a high training level and a low market tightness for skilled labor. On
the other side, a low training equilibrium can exist where the probability for trainees
to ﬁnd a job at another ﬁrm is high. This decreases the return to general training such
that ﬁrms train less, which sustains a high matching rate for trainees.
Only if unskilled workers are not credit constrained can the current ﬁrm extract
the whole rent from general training and prevent its trainees from searching. This
eliminates this externality and leads to an eﬃcient investment in general training.
187E x t e n s i o n s
Individual Bargaining
Assume that wages are negotiated after a worker contacted a ﬁrm. Firms take these
wages as given then; they choose the number of vacancies, the training rate and the
promotion rate. Nature chooses with probability β the worker to make an oﬀer and
with probability 1−β the ﬁrm. Workers and ﬁr m sa r ea s s u m e dt oh a v es o m eb a r g a i n i n g
power (i.e. 0 >β>1). If the other party accepts the oﬀer, a wage contract is written
and production starts immediately thereafter. If the oﬀer is rejected, the respondent
can leave the negotiation table and continue searching (both parties), or he can wait
for the bargaining game to start again next period.
During this period the worker receives the ﬂow-utility of leisure normalized to zero,
s i n c ea ne m p l o y e dw o r k e rh a st ot a k ead ay leave while bargaining with a diﬀerent
ﬁrm. The ﬁrm makes no loss or gain, since it does not advertise the job vacancy during
negotiations.
At the same time there is a positive probability δdt that the worker exits the labor
market. This could result in a breakdown of the negotiations, where the worker receives
a ﬂow utility of zero and the ﬁrm continues searching with the unﬁlled vacancy, which
has a value of zero due to free entry. The ﬁrm’s payoﬀ while negotiations are postponed
is also zero, as mentioned above.
The outside options of the workers are to take another day leave which gives him
zero utility. The outside option for a ﬁrm is to walk away and to search for another
worker. Since the value of a vacancy (i.e. searching) is zero in equilibrium, the outside
option of the ﬁr mh a sav a l u eo fz e r o .
In case of a breakdown, payoﬀs are zero. The outside and the inside options are
not binding so that the bargaining model simpliﬁes to a random proposer Rubinstein
model. Furthermore, the fact that the discount rates for ﬁr m sa n dw o r k e r sa r ei d e n t i c a l
implies that the bargaining power is equivalent to the probability of being chosen by
19nature to make an oﬀer. Muthoo (1999, ch. 3.2 and 7.2.4) shows that the solution to





li (lu,l s + lt).
The assumption that an employed worker receives only the value of leisure and not his
wage while negotiations are postponed ensuresas i n g l ew a g ef o re a c ht y p eo fl a b o r .T h i s
implies that employed workers do not gain by searching for an identical job at another
ﬁrm. Therefore, only the unemployed and trainees will search. This assumption is
relaxed below.
On-the-job Search and Search Intensity
In the preceding analysis the bargaining game was chosen such that only unemployed
and trainees searched but not the skilled and unskilled workers. If one assumes that
the inside option of a worker is his current wage and not the value of leisure, then
on-the-job search will arise since workers can increase their wage every time they meet
a new employer, i.e.
wi,e =( 1− β)wi,e−1 + βF
0
li (lu,l s + lt),( 2 7 )
where e is an index for the number of employers the worker was/is employed with and
wi,e−1 indicates the wage at the last employer or in the case of the ﬁrst employer the
value of leisure normalized to zero. Thus, employed workers will continue searching as
long as they earn less than their marginal product.
Promotion would keep trainees away from the skilled labor market and lead to
eﬃcient investment in general training if workers are not credit constrained, since the
training ﬁrm can recover the promotion cost up-front via a lump-sum payment for
training equivalent to the cost of promotion. If workers are not credit constrained,
then the training ﬁrm will not promote the trained workers. It can, however, reduce
the trainee wage in order to capture the future wage increases the worker expects to
get from searching on-the-job.
20The result that training ﬁrms do not promote, or demand the lowest possible trainee
wage, only changes if the search intensity is no longer ﬁxed and costless for workers.
To introduce search intensity I follow Pissarides (2000). The matching rate depends
not only on the market tightness θi, but also on a worker’s search intensity σi,e,w h i c h
will vary with his wage and thus with the number of jobs he already occupied, and it
will depend on the average search intensity σi of all workers from his skill group. The








Assume that the search cost function k(σi,e) is convex and k(0) = 0, then the Bellman
equation for a trainee is given by:
(r + δ)V (wt,e)=m a x
σt,e
[wt,e − k(σt,e)+σt,eφt (V (wt,e+1) − V (wt,e))].
It follows that the optimal search intensity equates the marginal cost of searching with




= φt (V (wt,e+1) − V (wt,e)).
The convex search cost function and the fact that the expected utility gain of changing
employer, i.e. V (wt,e+1) − V (wt,e), decreases3 with a higher current wage guarantees
that each trainee will search less if his current wage is higher. However, trainees will
continue to search as long as they earn less than their marginal product. Nevertheless,
ﬁrms might be able to extract some rent from their trainees by promoting them imme-
diately after training since the promotion saves the trainees search costs and reduces
their incentive to search more intensively. A ﬁrm will promote a trainee, i.e. pay him
aw a g ews,e >w t,e, if and only if the lower matching probability compensates the ﬁrm
3This can easily be seen from equation (27) and the fact that V (wt,e) is bounded
above by the discounted sum of the workers marginal product.











li (lu,l s + lt) − wt,e + σt,eφt [0 − J (wt,e)],
where J (wi,e) is the value of employing a worker at wage wi,e. If the worker leaves,
then the value to the ﬁrm is zero. Provided the convexity of the search cost function
is severe enough, then the training ﬁrm will promote its trained workers.
8C o n c l u s i o n
The model presented in this chapter shows that in a search model where vacancy
creation drives proﬁts down to zero such that future employers of trained workers do
not beneﬁt from the training in other ﬁrms, then ﬁrm’s investment into general training
will only be below the competitive level if workers are credit constrained. The reason
is that unskilled workers have to pay their expected gain from training to the training
ﬁrm in exchange for being trained.
If workers are credit constrained, then the training ﬁrm cannot recover the cost of
training, since trained workers will search for a better paid job. This, however, does not
imply that trainees will beneﬁt from training, since the ﬁrm can extract the worker’s
expected gain from searching for another employer by paying him a low trainee wage
as long as the worker stays with the training ﬁrm. Only if the trainee wage is bounded
by the workers’ credit constraints do trainees gain from training.
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